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I.

RESPONSES TO GOLDEN MEADOWS OBJECTIONS TO
THE
STATEMENTS OF FACT CONTAINED IN THE APPELLANTS' OPENING
BRIEF
As an initial matter, all statements of fact and references to the proceedings

contained in the Appellants5 opening brief are relevant to the issues presented for review
and supported by citations to the record in compliance with Utah Rules of App. P. Rule
24(a)(7) and (e) of this Rule. Appellants statements of fact and their references to the
record are important as they demonstrate the issues that were raised in this case and on
appeal, the courts management of these proceedings and, Golden Meadows noncompliance with Rule 11(b), Rule 7(d) and Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure:
a)

Rule 1Kb) violation:

By filing the Rule 11 Motion, as is, without

addressing the plain language contained in the Notice to Quit at paragraph 3 (R. 4 (in
evidence R. 655)), without providing a collective review of the ancient documents
attached to Strand's affidavit (R. 2963) and, without acknowledging that the 1985
lease at issue before Judge Dawson, then Mr. Dawson, in the 1989 IRS action (R.
2987, R. 2995, R. 3749 ^4) is, the exact same 1985 lease at issue and in evidence
before Judge Dawson in this case (R. 975); and/ or, without addressing Mr. Pitts
references to the record, evidence, transcripts, his review of the file and court
recordings, and/or his withdrawals and corrections; that were served on Golden
Meadows and filed with the Court prior to the expiration of the 21 day safe harbor
period. (R. 3173 and R. 3441). (See Appellants' opening brief at pages 5-6 Tf 6, f 8 and
%9 and pages 15-43 and Addendum at 3);
1

b)

Rule 7(d) violation: By filing a notice to submit the Rule 11 Motion

for decision without reference to the Appellants Motion to Strike and Memorandum
in Opposition and, prior to the close of briefing. (R> 4170). (See Appellants' opening
brief at pages 6 - 8 fflf's 10 through 16 and Addendum at 3;
c)

Rule 7(f)(2) violation: By submitting the Rule 11 Order and

Judgment to Judge Kay for his signature prior to its service on the Appellants (R.
4420).

Although Golden Meadows said in their Certificate of Service that the

proposed order was served on the Appellants and on attorneys Sidney Baucom,
Andrew Stone and Mark Tolman at the law firm of Jones Waldo, neither of the
Appellants or the attorney's at Jones Waldo received it as stated by the Appellants in
their affidavits and by attorney Sidney Baucom. (R. 4430 (4431 f2), 4428 (4429 %L\
4423, 4427). (See Appellants' opening brief at page 9 ^[18 through ^[21 and Addendum
at 3).
II.

REPLY TO GOLDEN MEADOWS ARGUMENT THAT APPELLANTS'
HAD NO EVIDENCE.
Golden Meadows argues as a basis for the sanctions the lower court imposed under

rule 11 that the Appellants had no evidence for the assertions contained in the Appellants
Rule 63 Motion to Disqualify at 2; Rule 60(b) Motion at 2, Rule 60(b) Memo at 2, 3, 4, 5,
and 7, and; the Affidavit of Michael Strand in support these Motions at ffl['s 3, 5, 8, 9, 12,
17 and 43 (See Appellee's brief at pages 9 through 16) Golden Meadows also claims that
Strand asserts, but never explains or establishes that the issue, property, participants and
evidence in the 1989 IRS action were not the same. See Golden Meadows Brief pg 15,

2

last paragraph, 2 sentence.
It is frustrating to the Appellants to respond to the argument that the record is
devoid of any evidence supporting their statements of fact when Appellants, in their
opening brief have cited to the record, page and lines where such evidence may be found
and demonstrated to this Court that this information was within Golden Meadows
knowledge and possession prior to November 18, 2008 (the date Golden Meadows filed
the Rule 11 Motion). See Appellee's brief at pages 9 through 16 for arguing devoid of
evidence and Appellee's arguments and/or statements of fact

that fail to address or

acknowledge that evidence.
Please compare the above with the Appellants opening brief at pages 15 through 16
and pages 19 through 43 where Appellants point to such evidence with specific citations
to the record. It would have been much more meaningful if Golden Meadows had taken
Appellants' statements and citations to the record and Strand's ancient documents and
then shown how they were not evidence or that, somehow, they were inapplicable; but, of
course, they could not. Each citation by the Appellants at pages 15 through 16 and 19
through 43 of their opening brief offered evidence supporting their assertions of which
they have now been erroneously sanctioned under Rule 11. If "access to the courts"
guaranteed by the Utah Constitution l is to have any meaning at all the Appellants should
not be slammed with Rule 11 sanctions for attorney's fees just because they lose in the
trial court.

1

Article I, Section 11. Attached hereto as Addendum at 4
3

III.

REPLY TO GOLDEN MEADOWS ARGUMENT THAT IT'S RULE 11
MOTION CONTAINS THE EXPLICIT FINDINGS OF FACT INTENDED,
REQUIRED, AND/OR ENVISIONED BY RULE 1L
In the Appellants' Opening Brief at pages 19 through 43 the Appellants' have

quoted, verbatim, in indented single spaced quotes,2 in chronological order and complete
with citations to the record, the:
1) nineteen alleged initial "offending statements," contained in the Appellants Rule
63 Motion to Disqualify at 2; Rule 60(b) Motion at 2, Rule 60(b) Memo at 2, 3, 4, 5, and
7, and; the Affidavit of Michael Strand in support of those Motions at fflf's 3, 5, 8, 9, 12,
17 and 43, filed on October 14, 2008. (R. 2963, 3013, 3018, 3026);
2) identical statements of fact contained in Golden Meadows Memorandum in
Opposition to the Appellants Motion to Disqualify and Golden Meadows Rule 11 Motion
that were served on the Appellants on October 21, 2008 (R. 3036 (3052) and 3747
(3762)), and;
3) Appellants former counsels rebuttals to those statements prior to the expiration
of the 21 day safe harbor period in compliance with Rule 11(c)(1)(A) (R. 3173 and
3441); for a collective and impartial review by this Court that the statements of fact
contained in Golden Meadows Rule 11 Motion are, without exception, clearly erroneous,
against the clear and great weight of the evidence, and,

do not meet the strict

requirements of rule 11 required on motions for sanctions or findings of fact, objective
review and reasoning required by a trial court in granting such motions. It is clear from

2

in this courts usual line and indention format (See State v. Levin 158 P. 3d 178 UT App.
2007 f2 (last sentence).
4

the Appellants submission

at pages 19 through 43 of their opening brief

that the

statements of fact contained in Golden Meadows Rule 11 Motion are Not supported with
references or citations to page or line numbers to the record, pleadings or transcripts
where such evidence may be found, that they contain arguments and not facts and, more
importantly, do not address Strands ancient documents or the evidence, transcripts page
and line, recordings of hearings, references and/or citations to the record, presented by
Mr. Pitts on November 3 rd and November 7th, 2008, that contradicts them and, in fact,
proves quite the opposite. Judge Kay, the reviewing judge, could not accept the
statements contained in Golden Meadows Rule 11 Motion as proof of facts, evidence,
procedural matters, or proof of the legal services performed by Judge Dawson in 1989
without verification of their accuracy and without entering findings of fact, an objective
review and reasoning with respect to that matter.(Rule 11(c)(3) This manifest injustice
must be corrected.
It would have been more meaningful if Golden Meadows Rule 11 Motion (filed
on November 18, 2008) had provided references and citations to the record by page and
line that allegedly support its contentions and then shown how, with references to the
record by page and line, that the Appellants' former counsels rebuttal facts and evidence
(filed on November 3rd and November 7th 2008) and Strand's Affidavit and ancient
documents (filed on October 14, 2008) do not demonstrate the existence of evidentiary
support or a reasonable investigation of the facts; but, of course, Golden Meadows could
not.
Additionally, Golden Meadows claims at page 2 of its brief (second to last
5

sentence) and at page 18 at ^3 that the Appellants and their former counsel failed to
withdraw or correct any of the 19 statements within the time permitted by Rule 11 and,
that "At no time during the 21- day safe harbor period or thereafter did Strand and Allen
withdraw a single one of their unfounded statements of facts,". However, these claims by
Golden Meadows are also false. As recited verbatim by the Appellants in their opening
brief at page 21 f 3 (b) and pages 23-24 at ^5 (b) (for example), the Appellants and their
former counsel, did, in fact, withdraw or correct statements for the record within that
21-days (R. 3176-3177 f3, R. 3443^5).
Moreover, Golden Meadows brief reciting this Court's decisions in case numbers
2008083 8-CA and 20090012-CA along with unsupported, offensive, and unwarranted
personal attacks against the nature of the Appellants' character and Strand's memory have
nothing to do with whether or not the trial court is required to make explicit findings of
fact with respect to Strand's Affidavit testimony and ancient documents (R. 2963), the
statements and evidence presented by Golden Meadows in support of Rule 11 (R. 3747),
the statements and evidence by Mr. Pitt's made prior to the expiration of the Rule 11
twenty-one day safe harbor period (R. 3173, 3441), and, by the Appellants in opposition
(R.4037, 4147, 4096), and; whether or not the trial court must clearly state its objective
review of that evidence and information and its reasoning with a sanction under Rule 1JL
Clearly Judge Kay, the reviewing judge, could not accept the statements contained in
Golden Meadows Rule 11 Motion as proof that that the Appellants made 19 factual
contentions that were false and without evidentiary support or a reasonable investigation,
without any verification of Golden Meadows facts and evidence whatsoever.
6

Again, as argued in Appellants' opening brief, the ruling in this case should be
reversed as there are no real findings of fact, objective review or reasoning by the trial
court on the relevant points on which the Appellants were sanctioned.
IV.

OBJECTIONS TO "FACTS" STATED IN GOLDEN MEADOWS BRIEF
Appellants' object to various statements of "fact" contained in Golden Meadows

Brief because they are untrue, not in evidence, mischaracterized, incomplete, misleading,
constitute recitation of arguments, allegations, or claims, are derived from unverified or
other sources not admitted or admissible in evidence, do not contain references to the
record, do not acknowledge or address evidence that contradicts them

x^r do not

distinguish between facts or statements that were raised by Golden Meadows at the trial
court level and those which Golden Meadows raises for the first time on appeal, as
demonstrated below. References to page numbers in the following three sections apply to
their Brief In short, the "facts" stated by Golden Meadows are significantly unreliable
and must be stricken or otherwise disregarded in their entirety.
A.

Golden Meadows Statement of the Case

Page 1. The description that Strand and Allen attacked the trial court's decision by
attacking the trial judge is derogatory, scandalous, misleading, argumentative and devoid
of any evidence or references to the record. This alleged attack on the trial judge because
they, and their counsel, in good faith (R. 3016), believe that Judge Dawson's previous
employment with the US Attorney's office defending the Internal Revenue Service
requires his recusal under Chapter 12 Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 2 Rule 2.11 (See
Addendum at 2 and that Judge Dawson had a duty to make disclosure to the Appellants
7

at the onset of this case is, mischaracterized by Golden Meadows. Strands position
throughout these proceedings is that ownership of the house and furniture in question in
Petty entities names and the 1985 lease by Petty entity to him were a facade signed to
protect Appellants home and furniture from creditors including the IRS and, to protect
Petty's investment and Strands contribution in the 1982 Joint Venture Agreement. In
1989 the IRS took the position identical to that of Strand in this case that, in fact, the
Petty entity, Nupetco, was merely holding legal title and ownership of the home for the
benefit of Strand and that the 1985 lease was not valid. On April 18, 1989, pursuant to a
notice of levy on Strand and his MLK Investments entity (R. 2999 Tf3), the IRS executed
on the Property located at 1199 South 1500 East Bountiful UT that is at issue in this case
(R. 4 and R. 2987) and seized it's permanent fixtures and the furniture located inside (R.
2987).

Neuman Petty (Golden Meadows agent in this case and Nupetco's General

Partner) opposed the levy and requested that the fixtures attached and belonging to the
Property and the furniture located inside the Property be returned pursuant to the exact
same 1985 lease at issue and in evidence in this case (R. 2987, R. 2995 and R. 975). All
of these items were scheduled for sale at an auction in spite of Petty's affidavit and in
spite of the 1985 lease (R. 2978 paragraph 9). In 1989 the IRS and its counsel, Judge
Dawson, then Mr. Dawson, took the position identical to that of Strand's in this case and
refused to release the levy on the Property and return its fixtures or the furniture unless,
Strand,

(the owner),

paid the taxes. (See R. 2978 at paragraphs 4 (last sentence,

3

See Strand's Deposition Testimony at R. 641 lines 9-14, R. 2192 (pg. 476) lines 16-25
and R. 2193 lines 4-25 and Answer to Admission at R. 659-670]
8

stipulation referenced therein R. 2975), paragraph 8 and paragraph 9 R. 2985 at Tf4, R.
4120 and R. 2999). Strand was required to pay these taxes before the levies were released
and before the IRS would cancel the auction (R. 4120, R. 4121, R. 2999). Now, Judge
Dawson has taken the opposite position that, in fact, Nupetco was, all along, legal owner
of the house (R. 2702) and that there is a legitimate dispute regarding the ownership of
the furniture (R. 4303(R. 4073) April 11, 2008 transcript pg. 9 lines 21-22) and, that was
the basis for Appellants' motion to disqualify Judge Dawson and, for relief from the
summary judgment order pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 60(b).4 The ancient documents
attached to Strand's affidavit (referenced directly above) show that Judge Dawson was
not qualified to act in this case and that Strand was the owner of the Property and the
furniture in 1989 and Not Golden Meadows owner, Nupetco.
It, is frustrating to the Appellants to respond to the argument that the record is
devoid of any evidence supporting these statements of fact when Appellants, in their
opening brief at pages 15-16, pages 22-23 at f4, pages 24-25 at ffif's 6-7, and pages 38-41
at Tfll's 16 - 19, have cited to the record where such evidence may be found and further
demonstrated to this Court that this information was within Golden Meadows knowledge
and possession prior to November 18, 2008 (the date Golden Meadows filed the Rule 11

4

Authoritatively decided by the United States Supreme Court in Lilieberg v. Health
Services Acquisition Corp., U.S., 108 S. Ct. 2194, 2202-03, 100 L. Ed. 2d 855 (1988)
which holds that a party in a civil case can file a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) to
be relieved from a final civil judgment on the ground that the trial judge, was not
qualified to act in the case and that "forgetfiilness" of disqualifying facts which a district
judge should have known is not deemed 'the sort of objectively ascertainable fact that
avoid the appearance of partiality."
9

Motion). It would have been more meaningful if Golden Meadows had amended its Rule
11 Motion to address Strand's ancient documents and

Mr. Pitts rebuttals and his

citations and references to the record and legal authority (Liljeberg v. Health Services,
supra) and shown how this law and these references along with Strand's ancient
documents and testimony were not evidence and /or that, somehow, they were
inapplicable; but, of course, Golden Meadows could not.
Additionally, Golden Meadows misquotes Strand's deposition testimony at R.
2187 - 94.5 Moreover, in the face of a record that is directly against them, Golden
Meadows further suggests that Golden Meadows

collectively demonstrated with

objective information from the record that there was no bias or prejudice against Strand in
this case, sans any reference to those parts of the record it allegedly relies on or, to the
Appellants' former counsels rebuttals that contradicts them such as the October 24, 2007
transcript; the Feb. 13, 2008 transcript and, the fact that the Appellants were sanctioned
by Judge Dawson for abusing the discovery process for attempting to discover
information about the Notice to Quit at paragraph 3 and for requesting for more time to
discover information about the validity of the 1985 lease. See Appellants opening brief at
pages 19-20 at fl(b), page 32-33 at %l 1 (b) and page 38-40 at 1[l6(b). However, in this
case, prejudice is presumed. See Anderson v. Industrial Com'n of Utah 696 P. 2d 1219
Utah (1985).

5

Which deposition testimony by Strand at R. 2193 lines 4-25 actually states that Strand
allowed Petty to direct his activities and make business decisions for him for the benefit
of both Strand and Petty to protect Strand and Petty's interests without the input of
Strand and that Strand was fine with that arrangement.
10

B. Golden Meadows Statement of Facts
*p.

This paragraph should be stricken or disregarded entirely, since it contains

argument, allegations or claims, and not facts. The issues concerning Judge Dawson's
"jurisdiction" were investigated and resolved by the Court through ex parte contacts with
Golden Meadows counsel and without notice to the Appellants (R. 2250 (09/18/07 entry
(R. 3715) and R. 2263 (01/31/08 and 02/01/08 entries)).

The Appellants had no

knowledge of disqualifying facts until September 17, 2008 when they discovered the
ancient documents (R. 2967 f 14, R. 2968 ffif's 15-16). Strand's Affidavit testimony at ftf
is clearly different than what Golden Meadows claims. A complete recitation of Strands
testimony at ^[43 is found in the Appellants opening brief at pages 41-42 f 19. Disclosure
to Strand and Defendant Allen6 [emphasis added] by Golden Meadows and its agent
(N^uman Petty) and by Judge Dawson was required. See Chapter 12 Code of Judicial
Conduct Canon 2 Rule 2.11(A), (1), (6)(a), (b)and (c) and Rule 2.9 (A), (C) and (D)
(attached hereto as Addendum at 2)
^[2.

This paragraph should be stricken or disregarded entirely, since it contains

argument, allegations or claims, and not facts. This paragraph is

contradicted by a

collective review of Strand's affidavit and ancient documents (R. 2963).

Strand's

affidavit testimony at ^[42 is clearly different than what Golden Meadows claims and is
supported by Strand's medical records. A complete recitation of ^[42 can be found at R.
2972-2973.

6

Who did not participate in the 1989 IRS action and did not have knowledge of it's
existence.
11

f3.

This paragraph should be stricken or disregarded entirely, since it contains

argument, allegations or claims, and not facts. Golden Meadows objections are
contradicted by Strand's September 29, 1989 letter (ancient document) to Mr. Vano
Department of Treasury at paragraphs 1-4 (referencing the stipulation agreement (R.
2975), 6, 8 and 9. (R. 2978-2979) which are relevant and admissible pursuant to the Utah
Rules of Evidence Rule 401 and 803(16). Thus the record is clearly different than what
Golden Meadows claims.
%4.

This paragraph and its subparts should be stricken or disregarded in their

entirety, since they contain objections to affidavit testimony raised for the first time on
appeal, and not facts. Not one of these specific objections lodged by this paragraph or its
subparts against Strand's affidavit testimony at ^flf's 9, 12, 16, 21, 25, 26, 27, 30, 31, 3240 and 43 were raised before the trial court or contained in the Rule 11 Motion at issue
here, and the record does not reveal any request by Golden Meadows that they be
addressed. This Court will not address new issues and objections to affidavit testimony
raised for the first time on appeal. See PP&T, LLC v. Brinar 2008 WL 2224285 (Utah
App.)) Unpublished (attached hereto as Addendum at 1). See also, Monson v. Carver,
928 P. 2d 1017 (Utah 1996) (noting general rule that "issues not raised at the trial cannot
be argued for the first time on appeal").
A complete recitation of the actual statement of facts, evidence, reasoning,

and

objections, by Golden Meadows and by the Appellants, concerning the 19 factual
contentions at issue in this appeal, can be found in the Appellants opening brief at pages
15 through 16 and pages 19 through 43.
12

The Appellants respond to Golden Meadows new objections to Strands affidavit
testimony as follows and collectively state that Strand's testimony about this action and
about the 1989 IRS action against him and his supporting ancient documents are relevant
ancj admissible under the Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 401, 803(1), (3), (4), (6), (14),(15)
and (16) along with 807, where applicable.
Strands Affidavit at ^9

Golden Meadows did not raise these objections at the

trial court level and therefore they should be stricken or disregarded. See PP & T, LLC,
v. Brinar, supra, (Addendum at 1). More importantly, under Utah's liberal pleading
standards , the plain language contained in the Notice to Quit filed on August 31, 2007 at
paragraph 3 gives the Appellants' and the Court notice that the furniture is an issue in
this case based on the following language:
"Notice is hereby given that you are required to surrender and quit the Property,
including the removal of all your belongings therefrom (but none of the furniture,
furnishings and personal property belonging to Nupetco Associates) within five
(5) calendar days after service of this Notice on you.... (E^mphasis Added)
b)

Golden Meadows Memorandum in Opposition to the Appellants'

Motion to Stay the Order of Restitution contains the following language that:
"While the issue of Nupetco's ownership of the furniture in the Property has
not been litigated in this case and Nupetco is not a party, Plaintiff is aware that a
large part of the furniture and furnishings in the Property were sold to Nupetco
many years ago and remain its property. Thus, Defendants are under no
compulsion to remove such items nor would it be proper for them to do so. This

' That "The plaintiff must only give the defendant 'fair notice of the nature and basis or
grounds of the claim and a general indication of the type of litigation involved" Canfield
v. Layton City, 2005 UT 60 ^[14, 122 P. 3d 622 (quoting Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co.,
656 P. 2d 966, 971 (Utah 1982)
13

state of affair significantly reduces the burden of Defendants of moving." (R.
2355)
And;
c)

Judge Dawson's response to that argument at the April 11, 2008

hearing at page 9 lines 21-22 states "I guess there's a dispute on whether or not the
furniture even needs to be moved. . . ." (R. at 4303/R. 4073).
Thus, the record is clearly different than what Golden Meadows claims. Rather than
claiming "There is not one scrap of evidence that ownership of furniture was ever made
an issue in this case or that Judge Dawson "took issue" with respect to such ownership.",
it would have been more meaningful if Golden Meadows had simply addressed the
Notice to Quit (R. 4) and Utah R. Civ. P. R. 26(b)(1) and/or Golden Meadows argument
at R. 2355 and Judge Dawson's response (R. 4303/R. 4073 page 9 lines 21-22) and
explained why the Appellants were sanctioned for abusing the discovery process for
asking for information about the furniture and then shown how the Notice to Quit,
Golden Meadows argument and Judge Dawson's response are not evidence or that,
somehow, they were inapplicable; but, of course, Golden Meadows could not.
Strands Affidavit at HI2

Golden Meadows did not raise these objections at the

trial court level and therefore they should be stricken or disregarded. See PP & T, LLC,
v. Brinar, supra, (Addendum at 1). Golden Meadows provides no citation to the record
that supports Golden Meadows footnote8. The Appellants were Not and have Noi ever
been sanctioned for any statement that Judge Dawson represented the IRS against

8

Golden Meadows counsel must direct this Court and the Appellants to the parts of the
record which he believes support his statement. Utah R. App. P. Rule 24(a)(7) "All
14

Strand in 1989 regarding the furniture located inside the Property or that Judge Dawson
gained personal knowledge of the 1985 lease9 as part of that involvement. In fact, Golden
Meadows makes the statement of fact in its Rule 11 Motion (no less than four times) that
Judge Dawson was, in fact, involved in the April 18, 1989 IRS action against the
furniture located inside the Property [R. 3758 at pg. 12 (second paragraph), R. 3749 at
14, R. 3749-3750 at ^|6, R. 3750-3751 at 1f9] and that there is evidence supporting the fact
Judge Dawson gained personal knowledge about the furniture, the 1985 lease and
Neuman Petty and Mike Strand's relationship as part of that involvement (R. 3749 f4).
(See Appellants opening brief at page 22 ^[4 and ^[4 a)).
Moreover, Judge Dawson's, then Mr. Dawson's, positions taken when
representing the IRS as a US Attorney ("in the matter on the furniture") was that the 1985
leasehold was invalid and that Petty/ Nupetco was merely holding the Property and a
security interest in the furniture for the benefit of Mr. Strand. (R. 2978 ^[9, 4120, 4121 and
2999). In this case, Judge Dawson has taken a position directly contrary to that position
and held that, all along, the leasehold was valid and that Petty/Nupeto was the owner of
the Property (R. 2702) and that there was a legitimate dispute regarding the furniture (R.
4303 April 11, 2008 transcript pg. 9 lines 21-22 (R. 4073)), a position directly contrary to

statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be supported by citations
to the record in accordance with paragraph (e) of this rule."
9

The validity of which was disputed by the IRS in the 1989 IRS action (R. 2978 f9 ) and
by the Appellants in this action (R. 1496 (last paragraph)) and, (R. 1839 -1840 ffif's 1013, R. 1776-1777 ffif's 20-21 and R. 1814 at %4 (Stricken from the record on March 3 and
March 5, 2008 by Judge Dawson (R.4301 hearing transcript p. 50 lines 9-13, p. 57 line
9)(Order entered (03/17/08) (R. 2213))
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his position in 1989 and the position of Appellants' in this case. The Affidavit of James
Swindler filed on April 11, 2008 at R. 2250 (09/18/07 entry) (R 3715) and R. 2263
(01/31/08 and 02/01/08 entries), makes it clear that the issues concerning a) Judge
Dawson's jurisdiction to preside over this case and b) Appellants' motions to compel
information about the Notice to Quit and Rule 56(f) motion requesting time to discover
information about the validity of the 1985 lease, were, in fact,

resolved by Mr.

Swindler, the Court, and Wayne Petty, through ex parte contacts without notice to the
Appellants.
Moreover, Neuman Petty's May 19, 1989 Affidavit to the IRS (and its counsel
Judge Dawson) at R. 2987 and R. 2995 makes it clear that:
a)

on April 18, 1989 the IRS executed on a levy on the exact same

Property that is the subject of this case (1199 South 1500 East Bountiful, UT) and
seized the fixtures attached to the Property and the same identical furniture
located in the Property that Golden Meadows Notice to Quit (R. 4) required the
Appellants to leave and;
b)

that Neuman Petty used the exact same

1985 lease in 1989 as

evidence to the IRS (and its counsel Judge Dawson) that Nupetco owned the
Property and had a legitimate security interest in the exact same furniture at issue
and in evidence here (R. 975), purporting the Appellants' and Judge Dawson that
the lease was valid and binding and without challenge sans any reference to the
1989 IRS action that contradicts its position (See R. 970 fflf's 7-9 and R. 603-604

ff s 7-10)
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Thus the record is clearly different than what Golden Meadows claims. Again, it would
have been more meaningful if Golden Meadows had acknowledged and addressed the
Notice to Quit, the ex parte contacts, Neuman Petty's May 19, 1989 Affidavit, Strands
letter to Mr. Vano at paragraphs 1-4, 6, 8, and 9, the 1985 lease at issue both in 1989 and
in this action, the Escrow Agreement and the Subordination Agreement along with
Strand's payments and then shown how they were not evidence or that, somehow, they
were inapplicable; and/or explained how Utah Rule of Judicial Conduct Chapter 12
Canon 2 Rule 2.9 (A), (B), (C) and (D) and Rule 2.11 (A), (1), (6) (a), (b), (c) do not
apply, but, of course, Golden Meadows could not.
Strand's Affidavit at 1112 Golden Meadows did not raise these objections at the
trial court level and therefore they should be stricken or disregarded. See PP & T, LLC v.
Brinar, supra, (Addendum at 1). Golden Meadows Rule 11 Motion only objects to this
testimony with a general complaint that "there is no basis whatsoever for this
statement."(R. 3757 1(17) (See Appellants opening brief at page 40 1)17 and 17 a)).
Strand's Affidavit and ancient documents were not stricken from the record and remain
uncontroverted. Golden Meadows response does not satisfy their burden of rebutting Mr.
Strand's affidavit on this point. Golden Meadows must respond with an affidavit by
Neuman Petty or Judge Dawson that contradicts Strand's affidavit on this point.
Strands Affidavit at 1116

Golden Meadows did not raise these objections at the

trial court level and therefore they should be stricken or disregarded. See PP & T, LLC, v.
Brinar, supra, (Addendum at 1). Golden Meadows provides no citation to the record that
supports its footnote.

Golden Meadows response does not satisfy their burden of
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rebutting Mr. Strand's affidavit on this point. Golden Meadows objection is contradicted
by Strand's September 29, 1989 letter to Mr. Vano at paragraphs 2, 4 (Stipulation R.
2975), 6, 8 and 9 (R. 2978-2979). Thus the record is clearly different than what Golden
Meadows claims. It would have been more meaningful if Golden Meadows had addressed
Strand's letter to Mr. Vano and then shown how it was not evidence or that, somehow, it
was inapplicable; but of course, Golden Meadows could not.
Strands Affidavit at 121

Golden Meadows did not raise these objections at the

trial court level and therefore they should be stricken or disregarded. See PP & T, LLC, v.
Brinar, supra, (Addendum at 1). Golden Meadows response does not satisfy their burden
of rebutting Mr. Strand's affidavit on this point. Golden Meadows objection is
contradicted by the mast head and Judge Dawson's signature contained on Stipulation
(R. 2975 ) as well as Strand's Letter to Vano at paragraphs 1, 2, 4 (Stipulation R. 2975),
6, 8 and 9 (R.2978 and 2979 ). Thus the record is clearly different than what Golden
Meadows claims. It would have been more meaningful if Golden Meadows had addressed
Strand's letter to Mr. Vano and then shown how it was not evidence or that, somehow, it
was inapplicable; but of course, they could not.
Strands Affidavit at 125

Golden Meadows did not raise these objections at the

trial court level and therefore they should be stricken or disregarded. See PP & T, LLC, v.
Brinar, supra, (Addendum at 1). Golden Meadows response does not satisfy their burden
of rebutting Mr. Strand's affidavit on this point. Golden Meadows objection

is

contradicted by Strand's Letter to Vano at paragraphs 4 (Stipulation R. 2975), 6, and 8
(R. 2978 and 2979). Thus the record is clearly different than what Golden Meadows
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claims. It would have been more meaningful if Golden Meadows had addressed Strand's
letter to Mr. Vano and then shown how it was not evidence or that, somehow, it was
inapplicable; but of course, Golden Meadows could not.
Strands Affidavit at ^[26

Golden Meadows did not raise these objections at the

trial court level and therefore they should be stricken or disregarded. See PP & T, LLC,
v. Brinar, supra, (Addendum at 1). Golden Meadows response does not satisfy their
burden of rebutting Mr. Strand's affidavit on this point. Strand was present and has the
ability to testify that this statement was made. State v. Sibert, 1957, 6 Utah 2d 198, 310
P.2d 388. Thus the record is clearly different than what Golden Meadows claims.
Strands Affidavit at f27

Golden Meadows did not raise these objections at the

trial court level and therefore they should be stricken or disregarded. See PP & T, LLC, v.
Brinar, supra, (Addendum at 1). Golden Meadows response does not satisfy their burden
of rebutting Mr. Strand's affidavit on this point. Golden Meadows

objection is

contradicted by Strand's letter to Vano at paragraphs 4 (Stipulation R. 2975), 6 and 8
(R.2978-2979). Thus the record is clearly different than what Golden Meadows claims. It
would have been more meaningful if Golden Meadows had addressed Strand's letter to
Mr. Vano and then shown how it was not evidence or that, somehow, it was inapplicable
or provided an affidavit by Judge Dawson to refute this testimony; but of course, Golden
Meadows could not
Strands Affidavit at 130

Golden Meadows did not raise these objections at the

trial court level and therefore they should be stricken or disregarded. See PP & T, LLC, v.
Brinar, supra, (Addendum at 1). Golden Meadows response does not satisfy their burden
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of rebutting Mr. Strand's affidavit on this point. Golden Meadows

objection is

contradicted by the Escrow Agreement (R. 4120), the Subordination Agreement (R.
2999), by Strands letter to Mr. Vano at paragraphs 6, 8 and 9 (R. 2978- 2979) and
Strand's payment to the IRS to re-purchase the fixtures attached and belonging to the
residence and the furniture located at 1199 So. 1500 East Bountiful Utah (R. 4120, R.
4121 and R. 2999) as the owner of that Property. Thus the record is clearly different than
what Golden Meadows claims. It would have been more meaningful if Golden Meadows
had addressed the ancient documents referred to directly above and then shown how they
were not evidence or that, somehow, they were inapplicable and/or provided an affidavit
by Judge Dawson or Neuman Petty or any other document to refute Strand's testimony;
but, of course, Golden Meadows could not.
Strands Affidavit at ^31

Golden Meadows did not raise these objections at the

trial court level and therefore they should be stricken or disregarded. See PP & T, LLC, v.
Brinar, supra, (Addendum at 1). Golden Meadows response does not satisfy their burden
of rebutting Mr. Strand's affidavit on this point. Golden Meadows must respond with a
document or affidavit that contradicts Strand's testimony on this point, but of course,
Golden Meadows could not. Judge Dawsons memorandum response at paragraph 4
second sentence that he did not prepare this document is contradicted by his earlier
paragraphs (paragraphs 2 and 3) that he has no memory of the matter whatsoever,
moreover, Judge Dawson states that he has no memory of the stipulation even though his
name appears on the mast head and his signature is executed thereon.
Strands Affidavit at ^[32-40

Golden Meadows did not raise these objections at
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the trial court level and therefore they should be stricken or disregarded. See PP & T,
LLC, v. Brinar, supra, (Addendum at 1). The Appellants were Not sanctioned for any of
this testimony and None of this testimony was made part of the Rule 11 Motion and
therefore, they are not at issue. {See Rule 11 Motion at R. 3747, transcript of the hearing
R. 4498 and order R. 4420). Golden Meadows response does not satisfy their burden of
rebutting Mr. Strand's affidavit on these points. Judge Dawson's memorandum response
at paragraph 4 that he never appeared before Judge Swift is, contradicted by his earlier
paragraphs (paragraph 2 and 3) that he has no memory of the matter whatsoever. Golden
Meadows must respond with a document or affidavit by Judge Dawson that contradicts
Mr. Strand's affidavit, but of course, Golden Meadows could not.
Strands Affidavit at ^[43

Golden Meadows did not raise these objections at the

trial court level and therefore they should be stricken or disregarded. See PP & T, LLC, v.
Brinar, supra, (Addendum at 1). Golden Meadows response does not satisfy their burden
of rebutting Mr. Strand's affidavit on this point. Golden Meadows objections are
contradicted

by the Notice to Quit (R. 4), Strand's ancient Letter to Mr. Vano at

paragraphs 4 (last sentence), 6, 8, and 9 (R. 2978 ) the 1989 Escrow Agreement (R.
4120), the 1989 Subordination Agreement (R. 2999), Strand's corresponding payment to
the IRS as the owner in 1989 (R. 4121) and the contradicting summary judgment order
entered by Judge Dawson R. 2702 that Nupetco was the owner of the residence at all
times after 1985. Thus, the record is clearly different than what Golden Meadows claims.
It would have been more meaningful if Golden Meadows had addressed the documents
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referred to directly above and then shown how they were not evidence or that, somehow,
they were inapplicable; but of course, Golden Meadows could not.
Lastly, Golden Meadows Statement of Facts at fflf's 5-15 contain argument,
allegations or claims, and not facts. They too should be stricken or disregarded entirely,
since they are not based on evidence. Judge Dawson's response was filed after Golden
Meadows drafted and served the Rule 11 Motion and was not made part of this Rule 11
proceeding by Golden Meadows or by the trial court. The Appellants respond as follows:
Judge Dawson's single spaced responsive memorandum was not taken under oath
and does not constitute evidence. More importantly, it only refers to his lack of memory
and contains irrelevant and inconsistent claims; Paragraphs 2 and 3 are

irrelevant

pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's holdings in Liljeberg v. Health Services
Acquisition Corp. U.S., 108 S. Ct. 2194, 2202-03, 100 L. Ed. 2d 855 (1988) that
disqualifying facts which a federal district judge should have know but which he had
forgotten were sufficient to disqualify the judge under the federal statute and that Judge
Dawson's forgetfulness and/or inability to remember does not avoid the appearance of
partiality or satisfy Judge Dawson's burden of rebutting Mr. Strand's affidavit on this
points, And; Paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 are contradicted by paragraphs 2 and 3 and do not
satisfy Judge Dawson burden of rebutting Mr. Strand's affidavit on this points. Lastly,
Judge Dawson did not file the mandatory affidavit

required by Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure Rule 63(b)(3) even though he was ordered to by Judge Kay's Rule 63(b)(3)
request and was obligated to comply. (See R. at 3034 and Addendum at 3).
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Because Golden Meadows also presents its own unsupported opinions, claims and
legal argument with respect to Judge Dawson's response and his state of mind that were
also not raised by Golden Meadows at the trial court level in support of its Rule 11
Motion (See Rule 11 Motion R. 3747), such unsupported opinions, claims and legal
arguments are also not properly included in a Utah R. App. P. Rule 24(a)(7) Statement.
This court generally will not address issues raised for the first time on appeal. See
Monson v. Carver, 928 P. 2d 1017 (Utah 1996) (noting general rule that "issues not raised
at the trial cannot be argued for the first time on appeal").
That concludes the Appellants rebuttal to all 15 Statements of Fact / Objections,
by Golden Meadows, found on pages 3 through 8 of Golden Meadows Brief It would
have been much more meaningful if Golden Meadows had complied with Appellate
procedures and not raised new issues and objections in their Appellate brief or, at least
shown why these new and different statements of facts and/or objections that are not
contained in the Rule 11 Motion and not addressed in the transcript or the Rule 11
Judgment are, relevant to this Appeal and the trial courts requirement to enter specific
findings of fact and clearly state its objective review and reasoning (Rule 11(c)(3)) but,
of course, Golden Meadows could not.
C. Response to Golden Meadows Statements about B.I. Associates.
B.I. Associates is a Strand entity, and, a party to the 1982 joint venture agreement
between Strand and his entities and Neuman Petty and his entities (R. 650). B.I.
Associates is the owner of the 3.2 million dollars worth of production equipment referred
to in the 1982 joint venture agreement (R. 650). And, B.I. Associates was a guarantor of
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the $390,000 loan with Citizen's Bank that is at issue in this action. A collective review
of Strand's affidavit in support of Rule 63 and 60(b) Motions and his ancient documents
(R. 2963) reflect that the IRS, in 1989, took action against Strand and his entities BX
associates and MLK Investments, as part of an ongoing collection action, all of which,
Judge Dawson, then Mr. Dawson, was directly involved in as legal counsel to the IRS.
(See Strand's letter to Mr. Vano at fflf's 1-4 (stipulation R. 2975), 6, 8 and 9 (R. 2978).
V.

ATTORNEY FEES
Golden Meadows presumably knew that the Motion to Disqualify would be

referred to another judge unfamiliar with the procedural history of this case. It obviously
attempted to improve its chances of success by grossly misrepresenting to the judge what
had occurred in the course of the action. The Rule 11 Motion which contains those exact
same misrepresentations by Golden Meadows was a highly dishonest, morally corrupt
and despicable attack on the integrity of the Appellants and the judicial system. Its facts
are erroneous and could not have resulted from a reasonable investigation. (See
Appellants opening brief at pages 15 through 43). The only affidavit, under oath, filed by
Golden Meadows in support of its Rule 11 Motion, is, by Mr. Swindler regarding his
fees. This Affidavit appears to be a harbinger of his prior statement concerning Golden
Meadows position that an a honest man does not have to take an oath for Mr. Swindler's
10

(See Golden Meadows Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment at R. 602 f3 and Appellants response at R. 1838-1839 fflf's 5-6 along with
Strand's Affidavit in Opposition to Summary Judgment at R. 1775 ^[16, R. 1793, R.
1794, R. 1795 stricken from the record by Judge Dawson on March 3 and March 5, 2008
(R.4301 hearing transcript p. 50 lines 9-13, p. 57 line 9)(Order entered (03/17/08) (R.
2213))).
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affidavit is replete with lies and misstatements, for example, see, page 4 and 5 at
paragraph d. (first sentence), paragraph e., paragraph f, and paragraph g. (R. 3796 and
R. 3797) which magnifies his dishonesty. Golden Meadows position that the $3600
sanction against the Appellants is such a modest amount that in the interest of judicial
economy should not require this Court to require the trial court to enter specific findings
of fact, objective review and reasoning

is, contrary to Rule 11(c)(3) and the Utah

Supreme Court's holdings in Willey v. Willy, 951 P. 2d 226, 230 (Utah 1997), Griffith v.
Griffith, 985 P. 2d 255 (Utah, 1999), Barnard v. Sutliff 846 P. 2d 1229 (Utah 1992), and
Morse v. Packer, 2000 UT 86 1(16, 15 P. 3d 1021(quoting Morse v. Packer, 1995 UT 5
1J10, 973 P. 2d 422), and, simply a red herring to ward off any further incursion into the
true facts.
CONCLUSION
The Appellants, did, in fact, act in good faith. Irrespective of Golden Meadows
unsupported, offensive, and unwarranted personal attacks against the nature of the
Appellants' character and Strand's affidavit testimony (and ancient documents,) the law
remains the same: the trial court "must" review the Rule 11 Motion and the Appellants
showing of information, facts, reasoning, evidence and law that they did Not commit a
Rule 11 violation and "must" provide an objective review and the court's reasoning of
that matter. Griffith v. Griffith, supra. The impartial review required by Rule 11 requires
interpretation of the language contained in the Notice to Quit, transcripts, pleadings,
orders, and ancient documents, etc.... The Appellants' are entitled to this relief as a
matter of law. Griffith v. Griffith, supra. Reversal is therefore required.
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RespectfiiUy Submitted this ^> day of January, 2011

Michael Strand

C\;. fr^
Can Allen
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James C. Swindler
Prince Yeates & Geldzahler
175 East 400 South #900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Wayne Petty
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175 East 400 South #900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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ADDENDUM
PP&T, LLC v. Brinar, 2008 WL 2224285 (Utah App.))

1

Code of Judicial Conduct Chapter 12 Rule 2.11 (A), (1), (6)(a), (b), and (c)

2

Code of Judicial Conduct Chapter 12 Rule 2.9 (A), (C) and (D)

2

Utah Rules ofCivil Procedure Rule 11(b), 11(c)(1)(A) and 11(c)(3)

3

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 7(d), 7(f)(2)

3

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 26(b)(1)

3

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 63(b)(3)

3

Utah Const. Article, Section 11

4

Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 401

4

Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 612

4

Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 803

4

Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 807

4

WeblldVU
Page 1
UT App 198

Not Reported in P.3d, 2008 WL 2224285 (Utah App.),
(Cite as: 2008 WL 2224285 (Utah App.))

thermore, in order to permit meaningful appellate
review, a party's brief must specify where in the record such alleged error occurred or was preserved.
See State v Garner, 2002 UT App 234, U 8, 52 P.3d
467.

UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT
RULES BEFORE CITING.

Court of Appeals of Utah.
PP & T, LLC, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
John BRINAR, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 20070538-CA.

Brinar has failed to preserve this issue for appeal.
Brinar did not appear for the evidentiary hearing
that he had requested. Had he done so, Brinar
would have had the opportunity to present evidence
challenging the affidavits that allegedly consisted
of fraudulent testimony. By failing to attend the
evidentiary hearing, Brinar waived his opportunity
to properly object and preserve this issue for appellate review.

May 30, 2008.
Third District, Salt Lake Department, 060905872;
The Honorable Vcrnice S. Trease.
John Brinar, Pearlington, Mississippi, Appellant
Pro Se.

FN1 The record does not reflect that a
proper motion to strike the allegedly fraudulent affidavits was ever filed. Thus, this
issue was not preserved by the denial of a
pretrial motion.

Jared L Bramwcll and Steven M. Kelly, Salt Lake
City, for Appellee.

Before Judges THORNE, BENCH, and ORME.

Brinar next asserts that the trial court denied him
due process by failing to telephone him when he
did not appear at the March 5, 2007, pretrial conference. Brinar asserts that he was not given adequate
notice of this hearing. The essential elements of due
process mandate that a person whose rights are to
be affected by court action must be given adequate
notice and an opportunity to have the court review
the issue raised by such party. See Chen v Stewart,
2004 UT 82,^ 68, 100 P.3d 1 177. A party asserting
a violation of his due process rights must demonstrate that the alleged violation was harmful. See
Lucas v Murray City Civ Serv Comm'n, 949 P.2d
746, 755 (Utah Ct.App. 1997). In this context, a
party must demonstrate that the alleged error was
harmful because had the error otherwise not occurred, the trial court would have reached a different ruling. See id. Assuming that Brinar did not receive notice of the March 5, 2007 pretrial conference, the trial court remedied any harm by holding
a second pretrial conference on March 19, 2007,
solely for Brinar's benefit.

MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official
Publication)
PER CURIAM:
*1 John Brinar appeals the district court's judgment
entered on June 5, 2007 We affirm.
On appeal, Brinar first asserts that PP & T members
filed affidavits consisting of perjured testimony. As
a general rule, "claims not raised before the trial
court may not be raised on appeal." State \ Hoigate, 2000 l) l /4, \ l l , 10 V S<\ J46. To preserve
the issue for appeal, a party "must enter an objection on the record that is both timely and specific "
State v Range! 866 P 2d 607. 611 (Utah
Lt.App.1993). "The objection must 'be specific
enough to give the trial court notice of the very error' of which [the party] complains." State v Bryant, 965 P .2d 539, 546 (Utah Ct.App.1998). Fur-
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The record also demonstrates that Bnnar was given
multiple opportunities to have the trial court review
his claims in an evidentiary hearing and that he also
received adequate notice of the evidentiary hearing
dates Bnnar attended the pretrial conference on
March 19, 2007, wherein it was reiterated that the
evidentiary hearing would be held on May 23,
2007 Thus, Bnnar received adequate notice of the
evidentiary hearing and had an opportunity to
present his claims at that time Accordingly, the record demonstrates that Bnnar's due process nghts
were not violated
*2 Bnnar next asserts that opposing counsel acted
unethically and that this court should impose sanctions under rule I 1 of the Utah Rules of Civil Pro
cedure The basis for this assertion is that opposing
counsel did not inquire whether the trial court had
attempted to telephone Bnnar at the March 5, 2007
pretrial conference This claim also fails for lack of
preservation and is not properly before this court
Rule 1 1 ot the Utah Rules ot Ciul Pioceduie gov
erns sanctions and requires that parties comply with
specific procedures for initiating rule 1 1 sanctions
at the trial court level Bnnar did not comply with
rule 1 1 procedure See Utah R Civ P 1 1(e)(1)(A)

fees and costs under Utah Code section
38-9a-205(3) Thus, PP & T is entitled to its attorney fees and costs on appeal Accordingly, we do
not reach PP & T's alternative grounds for awarding
it attorney fees and costs However, we must address PP & T's request for double costs Bnnar's appeal was not frivolous Thus, PP & T is not entitled
to double costs under rules 33 and 34 or the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure
Accordingly, the trial court's judgment is affirmed
and this matter is remanded to the trial court to determine PP & T's attorney fees on appeal
Utah App ,2008
PP&T, LLCv Bnnar
Not Reported in P 3d, 2008 WL 2224285 (Utah
App ), 2008 UT App 198
END OF DOCUMENT

Lastly, PP & T asserts that there are alternative
grounds entitling it to an award of attorney fees on
appeal and that it may also be entitled to an award
of double costs PP 8c T's primary basis for seeking
attorney fees and costs on appeal is under Utah
Code section
18 9a 20^0) (2008)
Section
^8 9a 20^(3) provides '[ajfter a hearing with notice
to the affected party, the court may enter an order
requinng any party to pay the costs of the action,
including reasonable attorney's fees " Id If the trial
court determines that a party is entitled to an award
of attorney fees by law, the party may also recover
its attorney fees on appeal See Loads \ Imencan
rcononn Ins (a 62 7 P 2d P 9^ t\ t ih 1981)
The tnal court held a heanng on May 22, 2007, and
notice was given to the affected parties As requested in PP & T's petition for a civil wrongful hen injunction, the trial court awarded PP & T its attorney
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CH 12. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
CANON2
A JUDGE SHALL PERFORM THE DUTIES OF JUDICIAL OFFICE
IMPARTIALLY/ COMPETENTLY, AND DILIGENTLY.
RULE 2.9
Ex Parte Communications
(A) A judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications, or
consider other communications made to the judge outside the presence of the parties
or their lawyers, concerning a pending* or impending matter,* except as follows:
(C) A judge shall not investigate facts in a matter independently, and shall
consider only the evidence presented and any facts that may properly be judicially
noticed.
(D) A judge shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the judge does not
receive inappropriate ex parte communications through or from court staff, court
officials, and others subject to the judge's direction and control.
RULE 2.11
Disqualification
(A) A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the
judge's impartiality* might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to
the following circumstances:
(1) The judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party's
lawyer, or personal knowledge* of facts that are in dispute in the proceeding.
(6) The judge:
(a) served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy, or was associated with a
lawyer who participated substantially as a lawyer in the matter during such
association;
(b) served in governmental employment, and in such capacity participated
personally and substantially as a lawyer or public official concerning the
proceeding, or has publicly expressed in such capacity an opinion concerning the
merits of the particular matter in controversy;
(c) was a material witness concerning the matter;

a

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 7. Pleadings allowed; motions, memoranda, hearings, orders,
(d) Request to submit for decision. When briefing is complete, either party may file a
"Request to Submit for Decision." The request to submit for decision shall state the date on
which the motion was served, the date the opposing memorandum, if any, was served, the date
the reply memorandum, if any, was served, and whether a hearing has been requested. If no party
files a request, the motion will not be submitted for decision.
(f) Orders.
(f)(2) Unless the court approves the proposed order submitted with an initial memorandum,
or unless otherwise directed by the court, the prevailing party shall, within fifteen days after the
court's decision, serve upon the other parties a proposed order in conformity with the court's
decision. Objections to the proposed order shall be filed within five days after service. The party
preparing the order shall file the proposed order upon being served with an objection or upon
expiration of the time to object.
Rule 11. Signing of pleadings, motions, affidavits, and other papers; representations to
court; sanctions.
(b) Representations to court. By presenting a pleading, written motion, or other paper to the
court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or advocating), an attorney or unrepresented party
is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an
inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,
(b)(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;
(b)(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a
nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the
establishment of new law;
(b)(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically
so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further
investigation or discovery; and
(b)(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so
identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or belief. .
(c)(1)(A) By motion. A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be made separately from
other motions or requests and shall describe the specific conduct alleged to violate subdivision
(b). It shall be served as provided in Rule 5, but shall not be filed with or presented to the court
unless, within 21 days after service of the motion (or such other period as the court may
prescribe), the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or denial is not
withdrawn or appropriately corrected. If warranted, the court may award to the party prevailing
on the motion the reasonable expenses and attorney fees incurred in presenting or opposing the
motion. In appropriate circumstances, a law firm may be held jointly responsible for violations
committed by its partners, members, and employees.
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(c)(3) Order. When imposing sanctions, the court shall describe the conduct determined to
constitute a violation of this rule and explain the basis for the sanction imposed.
Rule 26. General provisions governing discovery.
(b)(1) In general. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is
relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or
defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including the
existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any books, documents, or other
tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable
matter. It is not ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial
if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence
Rule 63, Disability or disqualification of a judge.
(b)(3)(B) In determining issues of fact or of law, the reviewing judge may consider any part of
the record of the action and may request of the judge who is the subject of the motion and
affidavit an affidavit responsive to questions posed by the reviewing judge.

Utah Constitution Article I, Section 11. [Courts open - Redress of injuries.]
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, property or
reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered without denial
or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any
tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party.
Utah Rules of Evidence
Rule 401. Definition of "relevant evidence."
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that
is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would
be without the evidence.
Rule 612. Writing used to refresh memory.
If a witness uses a writing to refresh the witness' memory for the purpose of testifying, either
(1) while testifying, or
(2) before testifying, if the court in its discretion determines it is necessary in the interests of
justice,
an adverse party is entitled to have the writing produced at the hearing, to inspect it, to crossexamine the witness thereon, and to introduce in evidence those portions which relate to the
testimony of the witness. If it is claimed that the writing contains matters not related to the
subject matter of the testimony the court shall examine the writing in camera, excise any portions
not so related, and order delivery of the remainder to the party entitled thereto. Any portion
withheld over objections shall be preserved and made available to the appellate court in the event
of an appeal. If a writing is not produced or delivered pursuant to order under this rule, the court
shall make any order justice requires, except that in criminal cases when the prosecution elects
not to comply, the order shall be one striking the testimony or, if the court in its discretion
determines that the interests of justice so require, declaring a mistrial.
Rule 803. Hearsay exceptions; availability of declarant immaterial.
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a
witness:
(1) Present sense impression. A statement describing or explaining an event or condition made
while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition or immediately thereafter.
(3) Then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition. A statement of the declarant's then
existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive,
design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or
belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation,
identification, or terms of declarant's will.
(4) Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. Statements made for purposes of
medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms,
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pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof
insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation,
in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or
from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly
conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make
the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the
custodian or other qualified witness, or by certification that complies with Rule 902(11), Rule
902(12), or a statute permitting certification, unless the source of information or the method or
circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term "business" as used in this
paragraph includes business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of every
kind, whether or not conducted for profit.
(14) Records of documents affecting an interest in property. The record of a document
purporting to establish or affect an interest in property, as proof of the content of the original
recorded document and its execution and delivery by each person by whom it purports to have
been executed, if the record is a record of a public office and an applicable statute authorizes the
recording of documents of that kind in that office.
(15) Statements in documents affecting an interest in property. A statement contained in a
document purporting to establish or affect an interest in property if the matter stated was relevant
to the purpose of the document, unless dealings with the property since the document was made
have been inconsistent with the truth of the statement or the purport of the document.
(16) Statements in ancient documents. Statements in a document in existence twenty years or
more the authenticity of which is established.
Rule 807. Other Exceptions.
A statement not specifically covered by Rule 803 or Rule 804 but having equivalent
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness is not excluded by the hearsay rule if the court
determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is
more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent
can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purpose of these rules and the
interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence. However, a
statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to
the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with
a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, the proponent's intention to offer the statement and the
particulars of it, including the name and address of the declarant.

